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Abstract: 
In most countries large business enterprises today are organized as corporations. The 
corporation with its key attributes of independent personality, limited liability and free 
tradeability of shares has played a key role in most developed market economies since the 
19th century and has made major inroads in emerging markets. We suggest that the 
resilience of the corporate form is a function of the adaptability of the legal framework to 
a changing environment. We analyze a country’s capacity to innovate using the rate of 
statutory legal change, the flexibility of corporate law, and institutional change as 
indicators. Our findings suggest that origin countries are more innovative than transplant 
countries.  
 
 
JEL Classification: G3, K2, N2, P5 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate law and corporate governance are used in recent literature to explain 
differences in the performance of financial markets and firms. The objective of this 
research is to identify variables that account for differences in performance and to rectify 
deficiencies in corporate law and financial market development by changing these 
variables. Attempts to identify best legal practice and to develop legal standards that may 
be transplanted are endorsed by multinational institutions, such as the IMF and the World 
Bank (Pistor, 2002).  This strategy receives empirical support in studies showing that the 
level of minority shareholder protection in laws on the books does indeed have a 
statistically significant impact on the development of financial markets as measured by 
standard indicators, such as market capitalization, liquidity, and the ownership 
concentration of firms (La Porta et al., 1997 and La Porta et al., 1998). These studies find 
that countries belonging to the common law family have better minority shareholder 
protection on average than countries belonging to the German, French or even the 
Scandinavian civil law family. They also show that common law countries have better 
developed financial markets than do civil law countries.  
Implicit in this analysis is a causal relation that runs from legal origin to the quality of 
law to financial outcome. However, a brief review of the history of corporate law in the 
mother country of the common law, England, shows that only a few of the indicators that 
account for the high level of minority shareholder protection in common law countries as 
measured in these studies were present at the time the first corporate statutes were 
enacted as Table 1 indicates.  
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Table 1: Minority Shareholder Protection in English Law 
 Date of Enactment Comment 
Proxy by mail 1948  Prior to 1948, shareholders could vote by proxy only if 
this had been stipulated in the articles of incorporation; 
no mention is made of proxy by mail. 
 
Cumulative voting ( - ) ( - ) 
 
No blocking of shares ( - ) ( - ) 
 
Shareholder suit 1844 Direct suit implied in 1844; derivative action recognized 
only in 1975. 
 
Preemptive rights 1980 Adopted in response to EU harmonization requirements. 
 
Shareholders representing not 
more than 10 percent of total 
stock can call extraordinary 
shareholder meeting 
1909 The 1862 law required 20 percent.   
The threshold was lowered to 5 percent in 1948. 
Source: English Companies Acts 1844 to present.  
Note: (-) denotes that the relevant provision does not exist in the statutory corporate law. 
 
This observation raises the issues of why some countries have developed these 
protective mechanisms while others have not and whether a set of static indicators can 
serve as a proxy for the quality of law. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach 
to assessing the quality of corporate law, namely, the capacity of a legal system to 
innovate. The more innovative and adaptable a legal system is, the more likely it is able 
to respond to a changing environment and thereby give firms the possibility to explore 
new opportunities while ensuring a minimum level of investor protection.  
We use data on the evolution of corporate law in ten jurisdictions to explore this 
proposition. Each of the major legal families, namely, the common law family and civil 
law families of France and Germany, are represented. For each family, we include origin 
countries, i.e. countries that developed their formal legal systems largely internally or 
with only limited borrowing, as well as transplant countries, i.e., those that received their 
formal legal order from foreign sources. The four origin countries are France, Germany, 
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England, and the United States.2 The six transplant countries are Spain, Chile and 
Colombia belonging to French civil law, Japan belonging to the German civil law, and 
Israel and Malaysia belonging to the common law families. 
We find substantial differences in the capacity of legal systems to innovate along 
three dimensions, namely, the rate of statutory legal change, the flexibility of corporate 
law, i.e., enabling vs. mandatory, and the development of new enforcement mechanisms. 
First, our findings suggest that the rate of statutory legal change is substantially higher in 
origin countries than in transplants.  Although common law countries have had a 
somewhat higher rate of change than civil law countries among the four origin countries, 
the difference between origins and transplants within each legal family is greater than the 
differences across legal families. Second, countries with a highly mandatory statutory law 
exhibit less innovation than countries with a more enabling statutory law. Third, legal 
institutional innovation, in particular, the creation of new enforcement agents such as 
regulators, has been higher in countries with a more enabling corporate law than in those 
with a highly mandatory law. 
Our evidence is drawn from statutory corporate law provisions on issues related to 
corporate finance. In parallel work, we investigate corporate law more broadly and 
include the governance structure of the firm as well as the rules governing entry and exist 
(Pistor et al., 2002). However, it is in corporate finance law where we find both the 
greatest difference across jurisdictions and the greatest rate of innovation over time.  
In section two. of this paper we explain the meaning of legal innovation and develop 
a set of propositions to assess the innovative capacity of different legal systems. In 
                                                 
2 Whether the U.S. is a transplant or origin country may be disputed. The U.S. received the common law 
system by way of transplantation from England. However, since the late 18th century, the legal evolution in 
 7
section threewe present the evidence we find in the ten countries included in the analysis. 
Section four concludes. 
 
2. Legal Innovation and Propositions. 
 
Our major proposition is that the capacity of legal systems to innovate is more 
important than the level of protection a legal system may afford to particular stakeholders 
at any point in time. Minimum protections may be taken as a first indicator to assess the 
quality of legal systems. However, such protections may soon be out of date, as changes 
in the environment or the capacity of economic agents to circumvent established rules 
and to develop new forms of arbitrage will render previously effective protective 
mechanisms ineffective. This is true especially in areas such as corporate law and 
financial market regulation because socioeconomic and technological change is rapid and 
challenges the legal system persistently. The recent wave of financial accounting frauds 
in the U.S., a legal system that has been hailed as the most advanced system with regard 
to financial market regulation, Coffee (2002b) and Rock (2002), illustrate that innovative 
capacity is a continuous challenge.  
Innovative capacity does not specify the type of legal protections different legal 
systems should adopt or the institutions they should establish. In fact, innovative capacity 
refers to a given system’s ability to respond to the challenges it faces, which may well 
differ from those faced by a neighboring system. Therefore, we are not interested in a set 
of best practice indicators but, in legal change that responds to country or system specific 
problems. Moreover, we do not limit legal change to changes in the law on the books, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the U.S. has been sufficiently idiosyncratic (Horwitz, 1977)to justify its classification as an origin country.  
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although data availability implies that this is the least difficult case to establish; rather, 
we include indicators for the flexibility of corporate law and institutional change 
respectively. 
Hayek (1973) emphasizes the importance of legal evolution and change and points 
out that judge made law is evolutionary by nature. Statutory law enacted by legislatures 
may be swifter at times and may serve to correct judge-made law, but statutory law may 
also be used to restrict innovation and to infringe on individual liberties. Several authors 
argue that the common law is efficient, because the process of lawmaking by judges on a 
case by case basis lends itself to efficient rule selection (Priest, 1977 and Rubin, 1977). 
However, a potential selection bias affects litigation as Bailey and Rubin (1994) argue. 
Finally, a comparative legal analysis emphasizes the differences between code and case 
law in bringing about legal change (Merryman, 1985, Merryman, 1996 and Zweigert and 
Kötz, 1998). Building on this literature, Beck et al. (2002) use case law, defined as a 
dummy variable that indicates whether judicial decisions are a source of law, in addition 
to requirements that statutory law rather than principles of equity are a basis for court 
rulings as proxies for the adaptability of legal systems. Our approach differs in several 
respects. The focus of our analysis is on the law governing the corporate enterprise. 
Corporate law has been codified in all major jurisdictions, including the common law 
families, since the early 19th century.  Therefore, we treat statutory law as an important 
source of information for the innovative capacity of legal systems. In particular, we use 
the rate of statutory legal change since the first enactment of a formal corporate law as a 
proxy for legal innovation. 
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 Given the importance of statutory corporate law in all jurisdictions, the simple 
distinction between case law and statutory law is unlikely to capture major differences 
across legal families. Therefore, we classify corporate laws on the continuum from 
mandatory to enabling corporate law following Coffee (1989) and Gordon (1989).   
Mandatory law means that private agents may not opt out of the allocation of control 
rights prescribed in the statutory law. By contrast, an enabling law makes most of the 
statutory provisions optional and allows parties to reallocate control rights. The 
classification of a corporate law as enabling or mandatory has important implications for 
the relevance of judge-made law. When law is mandatory, judges may be called upon to 
enforce these rules but they have comparatively little lawmaking functions because the 
mandatory nature of the law implies that these functions are reserved for the legislature. 
When law is enabling or optional, judges play an important role in determining the 
boundaries of the permissible reallocation of control rights and in settling disputes among 
private actors with different claims to control rights.  
This classification allows us to distinguish between legal systems that belong to the 
same legal family. In particular, we show that there are important differences within the 
common law family in the mandatory vs. enabling dimension.  The law in Delaware, 
which is the leading jurisdiction for corporate law within the U.S., represents a highly 
enabling corporate law.  However, England, as well as Malaysia and Israel are located 
somewhere in the middle of a continuum from mandatory to enabling law.  The 
classification also leads us to reject the proposition by Beck et al. (2002) that Germany 
falls within the case law category.  In many areas of the law e.g., contracts and torts, 
judges in Germany carry out important lawmaking functions, but this is not the case for 
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the law governing the publicly traded corporation (Aktienrecht). German corporate law is 
highly mandatory3 so that case law is virtually absent. Indeed, corporate law textbooks 
suggest that, because of the scarcity of case law in this area, it is sufficient to read the 
provisions of the statute (Kübler, 1994).4  
Our third indicator of innovative capacity is legal institutional change. The 
development of stock markets has been accompanied by the emergence of new 
lawmaking and law enforcement institutions in the form of regulators, i.e., stock 
exchanges and state regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
the U.S. and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK (Coffee, 2002a). Recent 
work attributes the emergence of financial market regulators to the failure of courts to 
enforce the law effectively enough to deter stock and corporate fraud. Glaeser and 
Shleifer (2003) argue that this failure in the U.S. in the early 20th century is due to the 
fact that the judiciary was captured by powerful industry groups, which necessitated the 
creation of a new independent state agent. Pistor and Xu (2003) suggest that, even if 
courts are impartial, the design of courts as neutral arbiters implies that courts can 
enforce the law only reactively, i.e., after the victim or a state agent have brought action. 
This limits their capacity to prevent harmful actions from taking place. By contrast, 
regulators are designed to initiate law enforcement independently, which places them in a 
better position to prevent harmful actions from occurring. Tentative support for the latter 
proposition is found in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), who suggest that 
                                                 
 3 According to para. 23 V Aktiengesetz (Law on Joint Stock Companies) all provisions of the law are 
mandatory, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the law. 
4 The situation is quite different for closely held corporations (GmbH), for which courts play a very active 
role. The reason for the lack of case law governing the Aktiengesellschaft (AG) is widely attributed to the 
lack of procedural rules that would allow shareholders to take judicial recourse. 
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criminal sanctions administered by courts are less important than the existence of a 
financial market regulatory or supervisor for the development of securities markets. 
These three indicators of innovative capacity are not independent of each other. A 
highly mandatory corporate law limits the ability of private actors to reallocate rights and 
also limits the scope of judge-made law. The lack of private innovation and judge-made 
law may also affect adversely the rate of statutory legal change. This may be somewhat 
counterintuitive because statutory legal change can serve to implement radical legal 
change almost immediately. However, to the extent that statutory law limits the ability of 
private actors to experiment with new legal forms and restricts the courts’ ability to 
review these experiments, it limits the source of legal innovation to the legislature. 
Kaplow (1997) argues that legislatures can collect relevant information that would allow 
them to assess the demand for legal change.  From this perspective, limiting the source of 
innovation to the legislature may not impede innovation.  However, litigation may be 
superior to survey work in revealing critical information that may prompt a reversal in 
case law or an intervention by the legislature.  
Conversely, a highly enabling law that gives private actors substantial discretion in 
allocating and reallocating control rights among themselves requires an effective neutral 
arbiter to resolve disputes among competing claims. The more innovations by private 
actors, the more difficult it is for courts to keep up with the pace of change and the more 
likely it is that legal systems will suffer from deterrence failure (Xu and Pistor, 2002). 
Therefore, highly enabling laws governing the corporate enterprise may result in market 
collapse, unless the legal system has sufficient capacity to create new institutions to make 
up for the deficiencies in law enforcement. Put differently, a highly enabling law 
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provides a fertile ground for legal innovation. Unless a legal system proves capable of 
responding to the new challenges arising from legal innovation, this strategy may be self-
defeating.  The following propositions are derived from the above analysis.  First, the 
more mandatory is a corporate law, the less legal innovation will take place.  Second, the 
more enabling is a corporate law, the more legal innovation will take place.  Third, the 
more enabling is a corporate law, the greater is the need for institutional innovation, in 
particular for new law enforcement agents. 
We recognize that there may be different factors influencing the innovative capacity 
of legal systems. The constitutional system, including the allocation of legislative powers 
and the ease with which rulemaking powers can be delegated to other agents, e.g., 
regulators, may influence the responsiveness and innovativeness of legal systems.  
Moreover, political factors may hinder or support legal reform in corporate law. 
Colombia’s problems in maintaining political stability and fighting drug trade may have 
prevented a more proactive stand on issues related to matters of corporate law. We do not 
address these broad political and constitutional factors because they are beyond the scope 
of this research project. However, we do include a country’s history in developing its 
formal legal order into our analysis. Berkowitz et al. (2003) suggest that countries that 
have imported their formal legal order, rather than having developed it internally may 
suffer from the transplant effect. These authors show that legal transplants have weaker 
legal institutions than origin countries. In explaining their findings, they suggest that the 
transplant countries may lack a demand for the legal order that is superimposed on them; 
therefore, their governments may decide not to invest in institutions necessary to 
implement this order. Hence, we assert a fourth proposition that legal transplant countries 
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reveal less innovative capacity as indicated by the rate of legal change than do legal –
origin countries.   
 
3. The Data and the Indicators of Innovative Capacity 
 
We include ten countries in our analysis, of which four origin countries represent the 
major legal families of common law, French civil law, and German civil law and six are 
transplant countries. We select the leading countries for each legal family and add 1-3 
transplant countries to each family. The selection of transplants is guided primarily by the 
expertise of the authors. While we recognize the problems involved in not using more 
objective criteria for sampling purposes, our research involved a large amount of legal 
analysis, for which some familiarity with the legal systems appeared to be sufficiently 
important to overrule those concerns.  
We code legal change from the first enactment of formal corporate statutes until 
the end of 2000. We note two important observations at the outset. First, the earliest 
statutory laws of the four origin countries did not differ much from one another. All were 
rather short and paid little attention to the internal governance structure of the 
corporation, to corporate finance, or to the transfer of corporate control. They focused 
primarily on the formation of the corporation, the activities it could undertake, and the 
distribution of assets upon dissolution. Second, when law was transplanted, it was usually 
the most up-to-date  version of the corporate law. Thus, in theory, transplant countries 
had the chance to bridge the gap and catch up with legal developments in origin 
countries.   
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Regarding the contents of corporate law, our primary focus is on changes in the 
law that pertain to corporate finance, including provisions governing legal capital, 
changes in corporate capital, procedures for issuing shares, preemptive rights, and 
repurchase of shares. The major advantage of the publicly held corporation is that it can 
raise funds from a broad base of investors. Moreover, corporate finance rules play a 
crucial role in structuring mergers and takeovers, which are important features of the 
market for corporate control. In parallel work, we investigate the internal governance 
structure and rules on entry and exit of the firm (Pistor et al., 2002). We find that legal 
systems differ most substantially in the area of corporate finance, which makes this a 
fruitful area in which to analyze the scope of legal innovation. 
To determine whether corporate law is mandatory or enabling, we analyze the 
allocation of control rights with regards to core provisions of corporate finance in 
statutory law. Table 2 contains a brief definition of the variables and indicates the type of 
rule that we consider mandatory or enabling. 
 
Table 2: Definition of Corporate Finance Indicators 
Indicator Definition Mandatory Enabling 
Legal capital  Minimum amount shareholders 
must contribute when 
establishing the corporation 
Minimum capital or 
minimum par value of 
shares is determined in 
statutory law. 
No minimum capital 
provision in statutory law 
and/or corporation may 
issue shares without par 
value. 
Capital 
increase & 
decrease  
Provisions determining who 
may decide on changes in 
corporate capital and what 
majority requirements must be 
met for valid decision 
Unanimous or 
supermajority vote by 
shareholders is required. 
Majority shareholder vote 
is sufficient; higher 
requirements may be 
stipulated in corporate 
charter. 
Authorized, 
unissued 
capital 
Once shareholders have 
authorized the issuance of new 
shares, directors may determine 
when and at what price to issue 
them 
Authorized stock is not 
provided for or 
prohibited. 
Directors may determine 
the timing and pricing of 
share issuances. 
Preemptive 
rights 
Right of existing shareholders to 
buy newly issued shares in 
proportion to their current 
Newly issued shares 
must be offered first to 
existing shareholders. 
For shareholders to have a 
preemptive right, the 
corporate charter must 
 15
holdings  stipulate it explicitly. 
Repurchase of 
shares 
The company has the right to 
buy its own stock  
The company may not 
buy its own stock except 
in cases enumerated in 
statutory law. 
The company may buy its 
own stock subject only to 
rules guarding against 
capital depletion 
 
The appendix contains the allocation of control rights over these issues for the ten 
countries in our sample. These countries fall into three broad categories, namely,  
countries with a highly enabling corporate law, those with a moderately enabling 
corporate law, and those with a mandatory corporate law.  
Delaware is the only country that fits perfectly into the first group of highly 
enabling statutory corporate law. It leaves the allocation of control rights over most  
finance issues to corporate stakeholders. While the first corporate statute of 1883 in 
Delaware and several subsequent revisions included a number of mandatory provisions, 
corporate law became increasingly more enabling. Most of these changes were 
accomplished by the late 1920s. For example, statutory nor case law stipulated the 
appropriate level of capital that had to be contributed at the time the company was 
founded. This rather broad formulation left it up to both corporate stakeholders and courts 
to determine the appropriate level of capital on a case-by-case basis. In 1929, the 
supermajority requirement for changes in corporate capital was reduced to simple 
majority. Thus, the legislature signaled that minority shareholders would not be able to 
veto changes in corporate capital. Creditors were not protected in corporate law; rather 
they had to protect themselves through contractual covenants.  Measures that could affect 
creditors, e.g. the redemption and retiring of shares, were left to the board to decide. 
Directors also obtained the right to determine the timing of issuing authorized stock and 
the pricing thereof. At the same time, shareholders’ preemptive rights were curtailed. 
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Whereas in the early 19th century, courts held that preemptive rights were a fundamental 
right of shareholders, the desire to use shares more flexibly as part of control transactions 
or to access new markets took precedence over these more traditional concerns. Since 
1927, Delaware law allows corporations to restrict preemptive rights or/and, as of 1967, 
preemptive rights must be stipulated explicitly in the corporate charter or shareholders do 
not possess this right.  
Corporate law in England never achieved the same level of flexibility.  Therefore, 
we place England together with Malaysia and Israel in the group of moderately enabling 
corporate law. In fact, contrary to the general trend from a more mandatory to a more 
enabling corporate law that we observe in most countries in this group, England has 
included provisions on minimum corporate capital and mandatory preemptive rights only 
in 1980. This was in response to EU harmonization requirements and does not necessarily 
reflect a shift in England’s general approach to corporate law. If we ignore these imposed 
changes, English corporate law has remained remarkably stable. The law set broad limits 
on the allocation of control rights, but left it up to corporate stakeholders to change them 
within these limits. As a result, shareholders remain firmly in control of most decisions. 
Unlike in Delaware, shares must be issued at par value and changes in corporate capital 
still require a supermajority vote of 3/4. However, the corporate charter was left to 
determine the conditions for repurchasing company shares and, as mentioned already, 
preemptive rights did not exist in England before it joined the EU. 
The two transplant countries in the common law family, Israel and Malaysia, are 
relatively close to the English case. Israel received English corporate law in 1929 and the 
first major revision in 1983 retained most of the characteristics of English law.  However, 
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the 1999 revision suggests that Israel is moving closer to the Delaware model. In 
particular, the voting requirement for changes in corporate capital have been lowered to 
simple majority vote and preemptive rights may be waived at the time the shareholders 
vote on the issuance of new shares. Part of the territories that comprise Malaysia received 
English law during the late 19th century. Similar to Israel, the consolidated terrtiroy of 
Malaysia received the 1928 English Companies Act in 1929. In 1965, Malaysia revised 
the law following the Australian model which is itself a copy of English law and has 
revised this statute several more times.  Although Malaysia has followed the Delaware 
model regarding decisions on changes in corporate capital, it requires a special 
shareholder vote for issuing authorized capital.  Furthermore, Malaysia allows share 
repurchase only for the purpose of reducing corporate capital, to buffer steep declines in 
share prices, as an alternative to dividend payment, or as a defensive strategy in a 
takeover contest. 
The third group includes countries in which corporate law mandates the allocation 
of control rights traditionally and gives corporate stakeholders very little flexibility to 
reallocate them. There are signs that flexibility is increasing because the law grants more 
exemptions to mandatory provisions. However, the general position that lawmakers, not 
stakeholders, determine the allocation of control rights remains largely unchanged. 
Germany and France, as well as the transplant countries of these legal systems, fit into 
this category. In 1870, Germany liberalized the entry requirements for corporations by 
moving from the concession to the registration system. This change occurred twenty-six 
years after England had made this move, and three years after France had taken a similar 
decision. Subsequently, Germany experienced a major founders’ boom, followed by a 
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crash.  The government’s response was to tighten entry requirements once more and to 
protect small investors by effectively preventing them from investing in large publicly 
traded corporations. The new law of 1884 mandated that the nominal value and minimum 
price for each newly issued share was 1,000 Reichsmark (RM), which was well beyond 
the capability of small investors to pay (Reich, 1976). In addition, the law required that 
all original contributions be fully paid up before the corporation was registered.  
In the next major revision of Germany’s corporate law in 1937, legal capital was 
introduced and any change in corporate capital required a three-quarter majority. The 
1937 revision also introduced authorized but unissued, capital, but, the board could 
exercise the right to issue this type of stock only for a period of up to 5 years. Stock 
repurchase by the corporation was prohibited in 1870; in 1884, it was allowed only for 
the purpose of decreasing corporate capital. In 1937, the prohibition to repurchase stock 
was relaxed so that the corporation could repurchase up to 10 percent of its corporate 
capital, but only for purposes enumerated in the law. In 1965, the list of exemptions from 
the prohibition to repurchases was extended to include employee stock plans and 
repurchases for raising cash funds to buy out shareholders with put options. Since 1998, 
management stock option plans are also exempted. To prevent misuse of this new 
flexibility, the law stipulates that repurchasing shares is not allowed for the sole purpose 
of trading in the company’s own shares.  
Preemptive rights became mandatory in Germany in 1897. Shareholders are in 
principle allowed to waive them at the shareholder meeting during which the capital 
increase is decided. However, case law established that such a decision is valid only, if 
the allocation of these shares can be specified sufficiently at the time so that shareholders 
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can weigh their options.5 For cases in which the purpose of the new issuance was to place 
shares on international markets or to use them as currency for future merger, i.e., 
transactions that are highly contingent on a number of conditions that are difficult to 
specify ex ante, this requirement proved difficult to satisfy. The German Supreme Court 
upheld this line of reasoning until the 1990s, when the first signs of a change in opinion 
appeared in a case involving Deutsche Bank.6 Finally, the court put aside the 
specification requirement in 1997 and accepted a waiver of preemptive rights on the 
grounds that the shares could be used for future control transactions.7 This decision came 
over seventy years after Delaware enacted an amendment giving shareholders the right to 
restrict preemptive rights in the corporate charter.  
The development in France parallels that in Germany. The relaxation of statutory 
provisions has often been accompanied by conditions that limit the newly gained 
flexibility. For example, although directors have the right to issue authorized stock, 
shareholders have to approve any change in the price at which stock is issued. Similarly, 
it has been possible to waive preemptive rights since 1950, but only for specific purposes. 
Recently, this conditionality has been loosened by allowing directors to issue shares 
within two years after authorization without a specific purpose. However, changes in 
price still require shareholder approval.   
Japan is also closer to the German model than to the Delaware one, despite having  
a U.S. style corporate law on the books since 1950 (West, 2001). Minimum capital 
requirements were introduced only recently. Shares repurchase remains restricted, even 
                                                 
5 German Supreme Court (BGH) of 13 August 1978, published in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 
1978, pp. 1316 (Kali-Salz). See also the Holzmann decision, German Supreme Court (BGH) of  19 April 
published in NJW 1982, pp. 2444. 
6 German Supreme Court (BGH) of  7 March 1994, published in NJW 1994, pp 1410 (Deutsche Bank). 
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though the list of exemptions has increased. The only issue on which the law is more 
flexible than the German law is preemptive rights. Directors may stipulate preemptive 
rights with each new share issue.  Spain also fits into the third group of countries. This 
classification may be due to a path dependent legal development because Spain borrowed 
extensively from France in the nineteenth century. In addition, Chilean law falls into this 
category. Although revisions in 1981 and subsequent years were influenced strongly by 
US law, Chilean law remains to this day much more mandatory than the laws of 
Delaware or other common law jurisdictions in our sample. Thus, changes in corporate 
capital still require supermajority vote and unissued authorized stock is not provided by 
law!  Furthermore, preemptive rights are mandatory and the repurchase of shares remains 
prohibited. Earlier law in Chile and Colombian law was even more restrictive in that it 
allocated a number of important control rights explicitly to government agents rather than 
to corporate stakeholders. In 1854, Chilean law required two separate presidential decrees 
for establishing a corporation and any decrease in corporate capital was subject to 
government approval. Moreover, the registering authority stipulated the amount of legal 
capital at the time of incorporation. State control rights have been equally common in 
Colombia since that country copied Chilean law in 1887; many of these statutes are still 
on the books today.  
This brief overview suggests that the sample consists of two outliers, namely, 
Delaware on the flexible end of the spectrum and Colombia on the restrictive side. The 
remaining eight countries fit somewhere in the middle. England and English transplant 
countries are somewhat closer to Delaware. Although Japan received U.S. – style 
corporate law in 1950, albeit from Illinois and not from Delaware as West (2001a) 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 BGH, 23. 6. 1997 – II ZR 132/93, published in NJW 2997 (42) pp. 2815. 
 21
asserts, the country has remained more faithful to the civil law tradition from which it 
original borrowed its institutions.  
The rate of legal change is a simple measure of the frequency of statutory legal 
change over the course of a law’s lifetime. To compute the rate of legal change, we 
include all major statutory changes, not only those that address corporate finance issues. 
Major legal change is defined as a substantive change of legal provisions, beyond 
editorial changes or changes to ensure consistency with other legal reform projects. 
While judgment is required, we find little dispute in secondary sources in any of the 
countries over the dates when important changes in, or revisions of, corporate law 
occurred. Table 3 documents the dates of major legal changes in corporate law in the ten 
countries.  
 
Table 3: Legal Changes in Statutory Corporate Law 
France Germany UK US French Tr. Germ.Tr. English Tr. 
   Del. Spain Chile Colombia Japan Israel Malaysia 
1807 1861 1844 1883 1829 1854 1853 1899 1929 1929 
1856 1870 1862 1899 1848 1865 1887 1938 1968 1965 
1867 1884 1867 1901 1868 1878 1888 1950 1983 1972 
1907 1897 1877 1917 1869 1924 1898 1952 1986 1983 
1931 1931 1879 1927 1885 1929 1931 1955 1999 1985 
1935 1937 1880 1929 1919 1931 1950 1966  1987 
1937 1965 1890 1931 1942 1947 1971 1969  1993 
1943 1969 1892 1935 1947 1970  1971   
1953 1976 1909 1937 1951 1981  1974   
1966 1978 1929 1943 1988 1987  1981   
1978 1982 1948 1949 1989 1994  1988   
1981 1994 1967 1957 1994   1990   
1984 1998 1972 1967 1995   1992   
1989  1980 1988 1998   1993   
1994  1985     1994   
1999  1986     1997   
  1987     1999   
  1989        
  1993        
Note: Tr stands for transplant. 
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This measure of the rate of change does not capture the contents of change so that it is 
not a direct measure of legal innovation, because legal change may re-enforce the status 
quo or even indicate regress rather than progress. For example, Colombia allowed 
companies to incorporate freely in 1853, but required state approval in the 1887 law.  
Nevertheless, statutory legal change may be taken as a rough proxy of the 
responsiveness of statutory law to observed or perceived problems. The lack of statutory 
change may indicate that the original law works perfectly well and does not require 
adjustments. In an ideal world, laws should be fairly stable over time in order to ensure 
calculability of a legal system (Weber, 1981). Each legal change requires adjustment in 
corporate statutes or business strategies so that it imposes a cost. Furthermore, a stable 
law is a better platform for long-term planning. However, there is much need for legal 
change in the real world, because lawmakers can not foresee all future contingencies. 
Therefore, they must write incomplete law as Pistor and Xu (2003) and Xu and Pistor 
(2002) assert. Once gaps in the law become apparent, lawmakers may want to fill them 
by writing new law or by reallocating lawmaking and law enforcement powers to agents 
who are capable of responding more flexibly to such changes.  
Table 4 lists the rate of change in corporate law as measured by the average number 
of years between each major legal change from the first enactment of  corporate statutes 
in a given country to 2000.  
 
 
Table 4: Rate of Statutory Change in Corporate Law 
 
Countries Ratio of Change 
Chile 14.6 
Colombia 24.5 
France 12.9 
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Germany 11.6 
Israel 17.8 
Japan 6.3 
Malaysia 10.1 
Spain 13.2 
UK 8.7 
US 9 
Sample Mean 12.9 
Source: Compilation by authors. 
 
For the whole sample, corporate statutes are changed every 12.9 years on average. 
Table 5 presents the means for the various classifications of countries, namely, the major 
legal families, for origin versus transplant countries, and mandatory versus enabling 
corporate law.  
 
Table 5: Comparison of Means 
Common Law German & French 
Civil Law 
Legal Family 
11.4 12.61 
Legal Origins Legal Transplants Source of Law 
10.5 14.4 
 
Highly Enabling Moderately enabling Mandatory Nature of Corporate 
Law 9 12.2 13.8 
 
As Table 5 indicates, there is little difference across legal families but substantial  
differences both between legal origin countries and legal transplant countries, and 
between highly enabling and less enabling or mandatory legal systems.  
Comparing transplant and origin countries, origin countries change their corporate 
statutes every 10.5 years, on average, while transplants take over fifteen years to make 
these changes. Delaware, which has the most enabling corporate law, changes its 
corporate statute every 9 years on average. However, this calculation understates actual 
legal change in Delaware, because the law is changed on an incremental basis almost 
every year. We do not capture these smaller changes because we include only major 
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change as defined above. Nonetheless, a series of smaller changes obviously necessitates 
fewer major ones. By comparison, the rate of change for the moderately enabling or 
mandatory legal systems is around 12 years, on average. Given the small sample size and 
the substantial variance across countries in different categories, generalization of these 
findings must be treated cautiously. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests that there are 
fewer differences in the innovative capacity for different legal families, i.e., common law 
versus civil law, than for transplant versus origin countries or for enabling versus 
mandatory legal systems. 
A major challenge faced by enabling legal systems is the settlement of disputes over 
competing claims for control rights. For mandatory legal systems, this is less of a 
problem because the law itself clearly allocates control rights and does not leave much 
room for their reallocation. Therefore, it is sufficient to have courts enforce or reinforce 
the mandated allocation. In fact, many countries with mandatory corporate laws restrict 
judicial recourse in matters that are regarded as organizational disputes and should be 
resolved among the relevant stakeholders. By contrast, enabling corporate laws allow 
stakeholders to reallocate control rights, making the system more prone to open dispute. 
Moreover, enabling corporate legal systems also give directors and officers more 
flexibility in deciding major business strategies without direct involvement by 
shareholders. Although some authors argue that market forces are the best control 
mechanisms against abuse of these powers, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) and  
Romano (1993), others are more skeptical and point to need of active law enforcement, 
e.g. Bebchuk (1989) and Coffee (1989). From the latter perspective, an enabling legal 
system is more dependent on effective enforcement institutions than are mandatory legal 
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systems. In fact, as Professor Coffee has argued before, the increasingly more enabling 
corporate law of Delaware has increased the demands on the judiciary to determine the 
boundaries of the flexible statutory law. In fact, he considers the judge-made law on  
fiduciary duties to be corporate law’s most mandatory core.  
Courts are not the only enforcement institutions governing the corporate enterprise. 
Financial market regulators have emerged over time to address the failure of traditional 
law enforcement institutions. At first, these regulators emerged as self-regulators and, 
overtime, the stock exchanges gradually assumed regulatory functions over the 
companies wishing to list on their exchanges.  The New York Stock Exchange 
established listing requirements for firms as early as the middle of the 19th century 
(Michie, 1987). The London Stock Exchange followed suit more slowly and somewhat 
reluctantly, but it eventually gave in to market and government pressures (Coffee, 2002a 
and Michie, 1999). Notably, these leading stock exchanges were established in countries 
that we characterize as highly enabling and moderately enabling, respectively. By 
contrast, France placed the bourse under state control after suffering a major market crash 
in the early 18th century (Hopt, Rudolph, and Baum, 1997). Similarly, Germany 
responded to the founders’ boom and crash in the late 19th century with strict regulation 
of the stock exchange, which virtually stifled market development (Merkt, 1997). In both 
countries, the regulatory approach mirrored that of the legislation governing corporations 
and mandatory state controls triumphed over experimentation. To be sure, mandatory 
rules became the hallmark of U.S. – style securities regulation, which was enacted in 
1933 and 1934 in response to the 1929 stock market crash.  However, the emphases of 
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U.S. mandatory rules are on disclosure, which is less restrictive for experimentation and 
innovation than are mandatory rule that govern the substance of corporate affairs.  
The evolution of enforcement institutions in transplant countries is more difficult to 
trace. The transplantation of legal systems typically entails copying both laws on court 
organization and procedural rules. In addition, transplant countries often copy securities 
regulations from their respective origin countries in the hope of jumpstarting financial 
market development. However, empirical evidence suggests that legal institutions in 
transplant countries are mainly less effective than are their equivalents in origin countries 
even after controlling for GDP (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard, 2003). Hence, transplant 
countries may have been less successful in institutional innovation designed to address 
problems of law enforcement. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Our evidence suggests that there are indeed substantial differences in the propensities 
of legal systems to innovate. We find the greatest divergence between origin and 
transplant countries, on the one hand, and highly enabling and all other systems, on the 
other. In contrast, we find little evidence that the civil versus common law divide 
provides strong explanations for differences in legal innovation. The last result is 
somewhat puzzling because common law countries tend to be more enabling than civil 
law countries. However, not all common law countries have used the potential advantage 
of the information that is revealed by the process of active litigation. Unfortunately, 
litigation data are difficult to collect so that testing the proposition that the rate of 
litigation is the main determinant of the rate of statutory legal change is infeasible.  We 
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also find that countries with more enabling corporate laws are the leaders in developing 
new types of lawmaking and law enforcement institutions, such as regulators. In fact, the 
future of these systems probably depends on the invention of such mechanisms to address 
the risks that are present in a more enabling approach to corporate law. 
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Appendix: Changes in legal provisions on corporate finance 
 
 
Note: X denotes no change to previous column. (-) indicates that the relevant provision does not 
exist in the statutory law of that country. 
 
 
Delaware 1900 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Nominal value 
stipulated in corporate 
charter 
Shares may be issued 
without par value  
X 
Capital Decrease 2/3 Shareholder vote Shareholder majority 
vote 
Directors may retire 
unissued or 
repurchased stock 
Capital Increase 2/3 Shareholder vote Shareholder majority 
vote; directors may 
decide to set aside net 
assets. 
X 
Issue of authorized 
stock 
( - ) Directors may issue 
authorized stock 
X 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) Corporate charter may 
restrict preemptive 
rights. 
Preemptive rights 
only if stipulated in 
corporate charter 
Share Repurchase Repurchase implied Repurchase by 
directors’ decision; 
guidelines for prices 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
UK 1900 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Nominal value 
stipulated in corporate 
charter; no issue 
below par 
X Minimum capital 
requirement 
Capital Decrease ¾ Shareholder vote X X 
Capital Increase ¾ Shareholder vote X X 
Issuing authorized 
stock 
Directors may issue 
authorized stock. 
X X 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) X Preemptive rights may 
be waived. 
Share Repurchase Corporate charter 
determines conditions.
X X 
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FRANCE 1900 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Minimum share value 
stipulated by law; no 
issue below par. 
X X 
Capital Decrease Board resolution and 
2/3 shareholder vote 
X X 
Capital Increase Board resolution and 
2/3 shareholder vote 
X X 
Issuing authorized 
stock 
No No Board may issue 
authorized stock; 
price adjustment must 
be approved by 
shareholders. 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) Shareholders have 
preemptive rights that 
may be waived for 
placement with 
specified investor. 
Preemptive rights may 
be waived without 
specifying placement 
for 2 years; 
shareholders must 
approve changes in 
price. 
Share Repurchase No No Special prospectus 
and clearance from 
regulator required. 
 
 
 
GERMANY 1900 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Nominal share value 
stated in law; no 
issuance below par 
X 
Minimum capital 
requirement 
X 
X 
Capital Decrease ¾ Shareholder vote X X 
Capital Increase ¾ Shareholder vote; 
increase only after 
original contributions 
fully paid in  
X X 
Issuing authorized 
stock 
No Directors may issue 
authorized shares 
within 5 years. 
X 
¾ of capital must be 
present at the 
shareholder meeting 
that authorizes capital 
Preemptive Rights Preemptive rights 
granted by law; may 
be waved 
X 
¾ shareholder vote to 
waive preemptive 
rights 
X 
Share Repurchase Only in context of 
formal capital 
reduction and if 
provided in charter 
X 
 
Shareholders may 
authorize repurchase a 
maximum of 10% of 
total stock for 18 
months.  
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Israel 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Nominal share value stated in 
corporate charter 
X 
Capital Decrease ¾ majority shareholders vote Simple majority shareholder 
vote 
Capital Increase ¾ majority shareholders vote Simple majority shareholder 
vote 
Issuing authorized stock ( - ) ( - ) 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) Preemptive rights may be 
waived. 
Share Repurchase No repurchase Repurchase allowed under 
conditions stipulated in law. 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Nominal share value stated in 
corporate charter 
X 
Capital Decrease ¾ shareholder vote Simple majority shareholder 
vote 
Capital Increase ¾ shareholder vote Simple majority shareholder 
vote 
Issuing authorized stock Not addresses Shareholder vote required 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) X 
Share Repurchase Prohibited Permitted to reduce capital  
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JAPAN 1900 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Minimum par value 
stipulated in law 
X X 
Minimum capital 
requirements  
Capital Decrease Simple majority vote X 
(quorum raised from 
50% to 2/3) 
X 
Capital Increase Simple majority vote X 
(quorum raised from 
50% to 2/3) 
X 
Issuing authorized 
stock 
( - ) Directors may issue 
authorized stock 
X 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) Available, if 
stipulated in corporate 
charter 
Board may stipulate 
right with each new 
issuance 
Share Repurchase Prohibited Prohibited with 
exception of share 
amortization, merger, 
enforcement of rights, 
and payment of 
appraisal rights to 
dissenters 
X; exception extended 
to employee and 
management stock 
option for up to 10% 
of corporate capital if 
exercised within 10 
years 
 
 
SPAIN 1900 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Registering authority 
assesses adequacy. 
X Minimum capital 
stated in law 
 
Capital Decrease Unanimous decision X  
(2/3 at second 
meeting) 
X 
Capital Increase Unanimous decision X  
(2/3 at second 
meeting) 
X 
Issuing authorized 
stock 
( - ) X X 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) Preemptive rights 
established 
Preemptive rights may 
be waived by super-
majority vote. 
Share Repurchase Prohibited X Exemptions apply to 
employee and 
management stock 
option plans. 
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CHILE 1900 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Minimum capital 
fixed by government 
Minimum capital 
stipulated in law 
Minimum capital 
must be adequate for 
operation. 
Capital Decrease Prohibited Subject to approval by 
government 
2/3 majority 
shareholder vote 
Capital Increase Unanimous vote X 2/3 majority 
shareholder vote 
Issuing authorized 
stock 
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) X Preemptive rights 
granted by law 
Share Repurchase Prohibited X X 
 
 
 
COLOMBIA 1900 1950 2000 
Legal Capital Minimum capital 
fixed by government 
X 
 
X 
Capital Decrease Prohibited X 70% majority 
shareholder vote and 
government approval 
Capital Increase Unanimous vote X and government 
approval 
70% majority 
shareholder vote and 
government approval 
Issuing authorized 
stock 
( - ) X X 
Preemptive Rights ( - ) Preemptive rights 
granted by law 
X; exclusion only 
with government 
approval 
Share Repurchase Prohibited X X 
 
 
